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1. Bootstrapping
We think that some of our belief sources can furnish us with knowledge
of the world—that I can come to know, for example, that the bottle is
empty, by looking at it; that I had eggs for breakfast, by remembering
it; that the Tory leader has resigned, by reading the newspaper; that my
son has a temperature, by using a thermometer; or that 12 times 21 is
252, by mental arithmetic. Some of the most prominent debates in con-
temporary epistemology concern the conditions under which a belief
source can be said to have this power.
One question that has attracted considerable attention in these
debates is the status of the principle that in order for a belief source to
have the power to produce knowledge, the subject needs to know that
it is reliable. It will help matters to have a precise formulation of the
principle. For this purpose we need to introduce a couple of concepts.
On the standard tripartite conception of knowledge, which I shall
assume in what follows, knowledge is a species of true belief: in order
for a subject S to know that p, p has to be true, S has to believe that p,
and S has to satisfy with respect to p an additional condition that turns
her true belief into knowledge. I shall refer to this third condition as
warrant.1 Thus, when p is true and S believes that p, S will know that p
just in case p has warrant for S. But if p is false or S doesn’t believe that
p, S will not know that p, even if p has warrant for S.2 We can now use
the notion of warrant to introduce the other concept that we need.
Let’s say that a belief source is a knowledge source (in circumstances C)
just in case the fact that a belief has been formed as a result of its oper-
ation (in circumstances C) confers warrant on the belief.3
Now we can formulate our principle as a necessary condition for a
belief source to be a knowledge source. For reasons that will become
apparent later on, instead of discussing the principle that accords this
status to the subject’s knowledge of the reliability of the source, I shall




WR A belief source is a knowledge source only if the proposition
that the source is reliable has warrant for the subject.
For the last two decades or so, the dominant position on WR has been
that the principle should be rejected. However, an unpalatable conse-
quence of abandoning WR has been highlighted in the recent litera-
ture. It appears that once we give up WR, we are forced to condone an
intuitively illegitimate method of knowledge acquisition.4 In broad
outline, the reasoning that yields this conclusion goes as follows. If we
abandon WR, it becomes possible for a belief source to be a knowledge
source even though the subject doesn’t know it to be reliable. Consider
Roxanne, who forms beliefs on whether the petrol tank in her car is full
by checking whether the petrol gauge reads ‘F’. Suppose that this
belief source is a knowledge source, but the proposition that the source
is reliable doesn’t have warrant for Roxanne. Then it seems that Rox-
anne could mount an inductive argument for the reliability of her
petrol gauge. Each of its premises would be of the form
Pi At time ti, the gauge reads/doesn’t read ‘F’ and the tank is/
isn’t full.
Roxanne’s belief in each of these premises would be formed by looking
at the gauge at time ti. In light of our assumption, it follows from this
that the second conjunct of each of these premises will have warrant for
her. Hence, on the harmless assumption that Roxanne can come to
know whether the gauge reads ‘F’ by looking at it, we can conclude that
each of these premises has warrant for her.
Now, from Pi Roxanne can infer, for every i:
Ai At ti the gauge is reading accurately.
And from a sufficiently broad and varied collection of premises of this
form, she can derive inductively the following conclusion:
R The gauge is reliable.
Jonathan Vogel, whose presentation of the problem I have followed
here, has referred to this procedure as bootstrapping.5 Many epistemol-
ogists agree that once we accept that this belief source can be a knowl-
edge source for Roxanne, even though she doesn’t have warrant for
the proposition that the source is reliable, we have to accept also that
she can obtain warrant for this proposition by bootstrapping. And
since rejecting WR allows this situation to arise, the rejection of WR is
widely seen as carrying a commitment to the legitimacy of bootstrap-
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ping as a method for acquiring warrant for the proposition that a belief
source is reliable. It seems hard to deny that this is an undesirable out-
come, and some have seen it as a reductio of any account of warrant
that rejects WR.6 But others have resisted this thought. For them, the
acceptance of WR faces obstacles that should make us regard boot-
strapping as the lesser evil.7
Perhaps the most influential line of reasoning against WR is the
thought that rejecting the principle is the only effective response to a
very powerful argument against the possibility of knowledge. The argu-
ment seeks to establish that our basic belief sources, such as sense per-
ception, memory, introspection, and inductive and deductive
reasoning, cannot be knowledge sources. And it takes WR as its starting
point. Thus, for example, in the case of sense perception, WR entails
that our perceptual beliefs would only have the status of knowledge if
we knew that sense perception is reliable. But such knowledge, the
argument goes, would require reasons for thinking that perceptual
beliefs have a high true-to-false ratio, and such reasons would have to
include propositions that we can only know by sense perception. It fol-
lows that we cannot have perceptual knowledge until we know that
sense perception is reliable, and we cannot know that sense perception
is reliable until we have perceptual knowledge. This circle, the argu-
ment concludes, renders perceptual knowledge impossible. And since
the same reasoning can be applied to our remaining basic belief
sources, this strategy can be used to challenge the vast majority of our
knowledge claims. This piece of skeptical reasoning is often known as
the problem of the criterion, as it was first used by Pyrrhonist philosophers
to challenge the Stoics’ claim to have found a criterion of truth.8
The threat of skepticism is not the only consideration blocking the
adoption of WR. Other lines of thought should bear some of the blame
for the unpopularity of the principle. Here I’d like to single out two of
them. One is the impression that accepting WR would prevent us from
ascribing knowledge in situations in which intuition dictates that
knowledge is perfectly possible. According to this line of thought,
there are cases in which we would want to say that the subject can
acquire knowledge by applying a certain belief source, although she
doesn’t know that the source is reliable.9 The other is the idea that the
principle is incompatible with externalist and, in particular, reliabilist
accounts of warrant.10 If, as reliabilism dictates, reliability is a sufficient
condition for a belief source to be a knowledge source, then a reliable
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belief source will be a knowledge source, even if the subject doesn’t
know it to be reliable, contrary to what WR demands.
If these three thoughts are correct, WR makes knowledge impossi-
ble, precludes intuitive warrant ascriptions, and is incompatible with
what many see nowadays as independently plausible accounts of war-
rant. In this situation, treating bootstrapping as a legitimate method of
knowledge acquisition can easily appear as a small price to pay. My
main goal in this paper is to defend WR against these three lines of rea-
soning. I shall argue in section 5 that blocking the skeptical argument
doesn’t require rejecting WR. Then, in section 6, I shall argue that WR
doesn’t have some of the counterintuitive consequences that have
been attributed to it. Finally, in section 7, I question the claim that the
principle is incompatible with reliabilist accounts of warrant. But
before we turn to WR, I would like to consider, in sections 2 and 3, a
very similar situation generated by another epistemological principle.
The approach that I shall develop in section 3 for handling this case
will provide the central ideas of my defense of WR.
2. A Similar Problem
The dialectical situation regarding WR can be seen in terms of a
dilemma. On the one hand, we could accept the principle, but then we
are in danger of finding a powerful skeptical argument irresistible, of
having to accept important revisions to our intuitive knowledge ascrip-
tions, and of being precluded from endorsing reliabilist accounts of
warrant. On the other hand, we could reject the principle, but then we
would have to accept an intuitively illegitimate method of knowledge
acquisition.
Stewart Cohen has recently highlighted a parallel between the
dilemma involving WR and a similar situation regarding the principle
of closure under known entailment.11 I believe the parallel is real and
important, although, as we are about to see, the way I think it should be
drawn differs from Cohen’s approach in important respects. I shall
start by presenting the parallel as I think it should be drawn and later
consider how this differs from Cohen’s presentation.
Let’s start by formulating the principle that generates the dilemma
in this case. As with WR, I am going to concentrate on a version of the
principle that substitutes warrant for knowledge:
Closure: If p has warrant for S, and S knows that p entails q, then q
has warrant for S.
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The Closure Principle appears to generate a dilemma that mirrors
closely the situation that we have described for WR. Notice, first, that
the obstacles to the adoption of WR that we considered above have
close correlates for the Closure Principle.
First of all, Closure, like WR, appears to play an essential role in a
prominent skeptical argument. You know that your having a broken
fingernail entails that you are not an incorporeal victim of an evil
demon. Hence, by the Closure Principle, if you don’t know that you are
not an incorporeal victim of an evil demon, you don’t know that you
have a broken fingernail either. But you don’t know that you are not an
incorporeal victim of an evil demon—the argument goes. For ade-
quate reasons for ruling out this possibility would have to include prop-
ositions that you can come to know only through procedures, such as
sense perception, that would be reliable only if the evil-demon hypoth-
esis were false. Hence using these procedures in this way would beg the
question, as it would require presupposing that the evil-demon hypoth-
esis is false. Therefore we can conclude that you don’t know that you
have a broken fingernail. The argument can be applied to every prop-
osition that you know to be incompatible with a version of the evil-
demon hypothesis that you don’t know not to obtain, including the vast
majority of the propositions for which we take ourselves to have war-
rant. Clearly, this argument rests on the Closure Principle, and some
have advocated abandoning the principle as a strategy for resisting the
skeptical conclusion that the argument seeks to establish.12 Then
admitting that we don’t know that the evil-demon hypothesis doesn’t
obtain would not force us to conclude that we don’t know any of the
other things that we take ourselves to know.
The other two lines of thought against WR that I identified in the
previous section also have close correlates for Closure. On the one
hand, it has been argued that Closure is incompatible with our intui-
tions regarding the ascription of knowledge, since there are cases in
which we want to ascribe to a subject knowledge of a proposition p that
she knows to be incompatible with another proposition p*, even
though she doesn’t know that p* doesn’t obtain. On the other hand,
Closure has been attacked on the grounds that it is incompatible with
a certain externalist account of warrant. As Robert Nozick argued, his
tracking account of knowledge is incompatible with Closure, and con-
sequently Closure would be undermined to the extent that the track-
ing account can be independently supported.
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The parallels with the other horn of the dilemma are no less striking.
As in the case of WR, abandoning Closure would seem to force us to
accept an intuitively illegitimate method of knowledge acquisition.
Consider one of the examples that Fred Dretske used to argue that Clo-
sure is in conflict with our intuitive knowledge ascriptions.13 Assume
that, as Dretske claims, by going to the zoo and looking at the zebra
enclosure, you can come to know that the animals in it are zebras, even
if you don’t know that they are not mules cleverly disguised by the zoo
authorities to look like zebras, but you know that this is entailed by
their being zebras. Suppose a subject, call him Fred, finds himself in
this situation, and after coming to know that the animals are zebras by
looking at them, he goes on to derive the conclusion that the animals
are not cleverly disguised mules from the premise that they are zebras.
Now, since he knows the premise of this argument and he knows that
it entails the conclusion, it seems hard to deny that by virtue of this
inference Fred would come to know that the animals are not cleverly
disguised mules. But this is counterintuitive. Intuition doesn’t seem to
treat Fred’s inference as a legitimate method for acquiring this piece of
knowledge.14 This problem exhibits the same structure as the problem
concerning bootstrapping. Following Cohen, I shall refer to both prob-
lems collectively as the problem of easy knowledge.
Thus, Closure and WR appear to generate dilemmas that exhibit
important similarities. In what follows, I am going to exploit these sim-
ilarities by arguing that a very natural strategy for dealing with the
dilemma generated by Closure can be applied, with some modifica-
tions, to the dilemma generated by WR.
However, before we proceed, I want to discuss the differences
between my presentation of the dilemma generated by Closure and
Cohen’s presentation. There is a crucial disparity between our
accounts of how this version of the problem of easy knowledge arises.
I have presented it as arising from the rejection of Closure, whereas
Cohen blames the problem on the Closure Principle.15 Let me explain
why I think that Cohen’s diagnosis is incorrect. This version of the
problem of easy knowledge arises for a position that enables Fred to
obtain warrant for the proposition that the animals are not cleverly dis-
guised mules by deriving this conclusion from the premise that they are
zebras, which in turn he has come to know by looking at them. But in
order to make room for this maneuver, a position has to allow Fred to
know that the animals are zebras and that this entails that they are not
cleverly disguised mules, while not yet having warrant for the proposi-
EXTERNALISM, SKEPTICISM, EASY KNOWLEDGE
39
tion that the animals are not cleverly disguised mules. This is the situ-
ation in which he’d have to find himself before performing the
inference, if doing so is going to result in his obtaining warrant for the
conclusion. Thus, far from being generated by Closure, the problem
arises only for positions that reject this principle.
I shall not try to diagnose Cohen’s mistake. I can suggest only that it
might arise from a confusion between Closure and a principle along
the following lines:
Transmission: If p entails q and S knows that p, then inferring q
from p would enable S to obtain warrant for q.
But Transmission is different from, and independent of, Closure.16
Transmission postulates a sufficient condition for an inference to have
the power to furnish the subject with warrant for its conclusion. Clo-
sure, by contrast, imposes a constraint on an admissible combination of
warrant attributions to a subject: that for all propositions p, q and every
subject S, if we ascribe to S knowledge that p entails q, we should not
ascribe to her warrant for p without also ascribing to her warrant for q.
Transmission may seem to sanction Fred’s bootstrapping argument,
but, as I have argued, it has this power only if Closure fails. It follows
that those, like Cohen, who subscribe to Closure, have nothing to fear
from this version of the easy knowledge problem. If Closure holds, the
method of warrant acquisition licensed by Transmission will not, after
all, enable Fred to come to obtain warrant for the proposition that the
animals are not cleverly disguised mules by inferring it from the
premise that they are zebras, given that he knows that the premise
entails the conclusion. For if, on the one hand, he doesn’t know the
premise, then the antecedent of Transmission is not satisfied, and if, on
the other hand, he does know the premise, then, by Closure, he already
has warrant for the conclusion, and the inference would come too late
to effect warrant acquisition.
3. The Closure Dilemma
I have argued that the second version of the problem of easy knowl-
edge arises only if Closure is rejected, and hence that embracing Clo-
sure will make the problem disappear.17 But a proponent of Closure
has to find ways of dealing with the three lines of thought against the
principle that I sketched above. My goal in this section is to present a
proposal as to how to discharge these tasks.
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Let’s start with skepticism. If we accept Closure, my failure to know
that I am not an incorporeal victim of an evil demon will entail that I
don’t know that I have a broken fingernail either. Hence the only way
open for the proponent of Closure to resist the conclusion is to contest
the skeptic’s claim that I don’t know that I am not an incorporeal victim
of an evil demon. How does the skeptic defend this premise? In my
informal presentation of the argument above, the claim that I don’t
know that I am not an incorporeal victim of an evil demon was sup-
ported on the grounds that my evidence for this proposition is bound
to exhibit a feature that renders it inadequate. The precise construal of
this disabling feature is a delicate issue. Broadly speaking, the idea is
that my evidence for a proposition p will be inadequate if it is such that
it would exhibit a certain shortcoming if p were false. The problem for
the skeptic is to find a shortcoming that would be exhibited by my evi-
dence for p if p were false and entails that my evidence is inadequate,
even if p is true. Here I propose to waive these difficulties, since the
strategy that I am going to present for dealing with the argument will
not depend on whether the skeptic can find a satisfactory solution to
this problem. I am going to construe the skeptical reasoning using one
of the most plausible proposals as to which disabling feature invalidates
my evidence against the evil-demon hypothesis—namely, that it relies
on information that I can obtain only from sources that would be unre-
liable if I were an incorporeal victim of an evil demon. However, noth-
ing will turn on this particular choice of feature.
On this construal, the skeptical reasoning will involve a premise
asserting that my evidence is bound to exhibit the disabling feature:
A All my evidence for the proposition that I am not an incor-
poreal victim of an evil demon relies on information that I
can obtain only from sources that would be unreliable if I
were an incorporeal victim of an evil demon.
It will also involve a premise asserting that the presence of this feature
will invalidate my evidence:
NC My evidence for a proposition p cannot be adequate if it
relies on information that I can obtain only from sources that
would be unreliable if p were false.
Clearly A and NC entail:
B I don’t have adequate evidence for the proposition that I am
not an incorporeal victim of an evil demon.
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But this is not quite the conclusion that the skeptic needs. The skeptic
needs to establish the claim:
C I don’t know that I am not an incorporeal victim of an evil
demon.
But to progress from B to C, the skeptic needs to invoke an additional
premise, which I shall label Evidential Constraint on Knowledge (EC):
EC In order to know that p, a subject needs to have adequate evi-
dence for p.18
Without invoking the Evidential Constraint, the skeptic cannot derive
C from B, and without C she cannot contrapose on the Closure Princi-
ple to mount a widespread challenge to our claims to knowledge. Even
with Closure in place, the rejection of the Evidential Constraint would
block the skeptical argument.
Hence the proponent of Closure has an alternative strategy for
resisting the skeptical argument, provided that she is prepared to give
up the Evidential Constraint. This is indeed a familiar strategy for deal-
ing with this brand of skepticism—one that is commonly associated
with externalism, since externalist accounts of knowledge typically
license counterexamples to the Evidential Constraint. Vogel provides a
very clear presentation of how the reliabilist could avail herself of this
strategy (Vogel uses the term justification where I use evidence, and the
label Justification Condition for the principle I’m calling Evidential Con-
straint):
According to a very familiar line of skeptical argument, I have no justifica-
tion for believing that I am not a thoroughly deceived brain in a vat, and
consequently fail to know that I am not. Since I fail to know that I am not
thoroughly deceived in this way, I have no knowledge of the external
world. A reliabilist, or anyone else who rejects the justification condition,
will balk at the first step. She may concede that I have no justification for
believing that I am not a brain in a vat. Unless knowledge requires justifi-
cation, however, it does not follow that I fail to know that I am not a brain
in a vat, and the skeptical argument is blocked.19
These considerations suggest that the skeptical argument that invokes
the Closure Principle can be resisted by advocates of the principle, pro-
vided that they are prepared to give up the Evidential Constraint. I
shall not try to argue here that the Evidential Constraint should be
rejected. Instead I am going to assume that the principle is false, and
my defense of the approach that I am articulating will rest on this
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assumption.20 Hence my target audience will be restricted to those who
are prepared to countenance the rejection of the Evidential Con-
straint. This still leaves me with a sizeable audience, since, as we have
just seen, externalist epistemologists reject the constraint.
Let me now turn to the second line of reasoning against Closure that
I sketched above, according to which the principle is in conflict with
some of our intuitions concerning the ascription of knowledge. I want
to suggest that the rejection of the Evidential Constraint also holds the
key for dealing with the type of case that has been adduced in support
of this objection to Closure. I think the point will become obvious if we
look at the passage in which Dretske defends his claim that the zebra
case constitutes a counterexample to Closure:
[T]hink a moment about what reasons you have, what evidence you can
produce in favor of this claim. The evidence you had for thinking them
zebras has been effectively neutralized, since it does not count toward
their not being mules cleverly disguised to look like zebras. Have you
checked with the zoo authorities? Did you examine the animals close
enough to detect such a fraud? You might do this, of course, but in most
cases you do nothing of the kind. You have some general uniformities on
which you rely, regularities to which you give expression by such remarks
as, “That isn’t very likely” or “Why should the zoo authorities do that?”
Granted, the hypothesis (if we may call it that) is not very plausible, given
what we know about people and zoos. But the question here is not
whether this alternative is plausible, not whether it is more or less plausi-
ble than that there are real zebras in the pen, but whether you know that
this alternative hypothesis is false. I don’t think you do. In this I agree with
the skeptic.21
It is plain that Dretske’s case for the claim that you don’t know that the
animals are not cleverly disguised mules is based on the contention
that you don’t have adequate evidence for this proposition. Hence the
argument will be blocked as soon as we abandon the Evidential Con-
straint. Then we can concede to Dretske that intuition dictates that you
can know that the animals are zebras even though you have hardly any
evidence for the proposition that they are not cleverly disguised mules,
while refusing to treat the case as a counterexample to Closure. For in
the absence of the Evidential Constraint, your lack of evidence is com-
patible with your knowing that they are not cleverly disguised mules.22
Let me now consider briefly the third argument against Closure,
which seeks to undermine the principle on the grounds that it is
incompatible with a tracking account of warrant. It seems to me that
the incompatibility is undeniable, and hence that insofar as tracking
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accounts are independently motivated, we will have reasons for aban-
doning the Closure Principle. Hence the approach that I am advocat-
ing will hold little appeal for those who are committed to tracking
accounts. However, for those who are prepared to keep an open mind,
incompatibility works both ways, and many nowadays have come to
regard the independent plausibility of the Closure Principle as a pow-
erful argument against tracking accounts. Notice that the connection
between Closure and the problem of easy knowledge provides further
support for this position. Given that tracking accounts are incompati-
ble with Closure, and that the rejection of Closure generates the prob-
lem of easy knowledge, for proponents of tracking accounts the
problem of easy knowledge is inescapable.
4. Evidence and Warrant
Abandoning the Evidential Constraint amounts to rejecting a blanket
demand for adequate evidence as a necessary condition for warrant.
This rejection is perfectly compatible with the thought that there are
circumstances in which warrant does require adequate evidence—or,
more generally, that the amount and quality of the evidence that is
required for warrant will vary from case to case. I shall not try to provide
here a comprehensive account of the factors that determine how good
our evidence for a proposition would have to be before it can be said
that the proposition has warrant for us. I only want to single out one
factor that seems to me to play a major role in fixing the evidence
threshold for warrant. In the case of a true contingent proposition, the
factor that I have in mind is how different things would have to be in
order for the proposition to be false.23 My claim is that the following
principle will have to be an important ingredient of a correct account
of how evidence is connected with warrant:
EW The quality of the evidence that a subject has to have for a
true contingent proposition p in order to have warrant for p
is, ceteris paribus, inversely proportional to how different
things would have to be in order for p to be false.24
I shall not try to provide support for EW, although I don’t think it
would be hard to argue that our intuitive ascriptions of warrant follow
this pattern.25 I want to concentrate instead on how this principle, if
correct, would affect our discussion of closure skepticism.
If we applied EW to Dretske’s zebra example, it would explain why
Fred needs very little by way of evidence for the proposition that the
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animals in the zebra enclosure are not cleverly disguised mules in
order to count as knowing this. This is so because things would have to
be very different from what they actually are in order for the animals to
be cleverly disguised mules. For this reason, the poor quality of Fred’s
evidence doesn’t undermine the claim that he knows. Consequently,
the claim that he knows that the animals are zebras cannot be attacked
on the basis of his lack of adequate evidence, even with Closure in
place.
If things didn’t have to be so different in order for the proposition
to be false, we would have a different situation. Suppose, for example,
that Fred encounters the display labeled ‘zebra enclosure’, not in the
zoo, but in an exhibition of British conceptual art. Then even if the
zebra-looking animals he sees are real zebras, things wouldn’t have to
be all that different for them to be cleverly disguised mules. Hence, by
EW, in order to know that the animals are not cleverly disguised mules,
Fred would have to satisfy a higher threshold of evidence. If he didn’t
pass this test, he would not know that the animals are not cleverly dis-
guised mules, and hence, by Closure, he wouldn’t know that they are
zebras either, even if, as it happens, that’s what they are.
Notice that the limited extent to which the EW connects evidence
with knowledge is much less than what the skeptic would need to res-
cue her argument. If the world is, by and large, as we take it to be, then
my being an incorporeal victim of an evil demon would require things
to be very different from how they are—vastly more different than they
would have to be for the animals Fred is looking at to be mules. Hence,
according to EW, if our conception of the world is broadly correct,
knowing that I am not an incorporeal victim of an evil demon will not
require having nonnegligible evidence for this proposition. I could
know with little or no evidence, and hence the skeptical argument
would still not go through.
Of course, our conception of the world could be radically wrong,
and things might not need to be all that different in order for me to be
an incorporeal victim of an evil demon.26 In this case, EW will not pro-
tect my warrant for the proposition that this is not what I am from my
lack of adequate evidence for it.27 But I think we can concede this
point to the skeptic without allowing her to rescue her argument. If the
skeptic convinced me that my conception of the world is wrong in treat-
ing the evil demon hypothesis as far-fetched, I would conclude from
this that I have no warrant for the proposition that I am not an incor-
poreal victim of an evil demon, and hence, by Closure, that I have no
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warrant for any other proposition of which I know that it entails that
the evil-demon hypothesis is false. But pursuing this line is well beyond
the skeptic’s resources. The skeptic never claimed to have an argument
for the claim that the actual world is not radically different from how
the evil-demon hypothesis portrays it—only an argument to show that
I don’t know that the hypothesis doesn’t obtain. We are conceding that
if she had the former she would have the latter, but since she doesn’t
claim to have the former, we are not conceding that she has the latter.
Abandoning the Evidential Constraint defuses the skeptical argument,
even after the link between evidence and warrant is partially restored
by EW.
5. The Criterion
With respect to the dilemma generated by Closure, I have advocated a
position that preempts the problem of easy knowledge by endorsing
the principle, and seeks to solve the ensuing skeptical difficulties by
abandoning the Evidential Constraint. In this section, I am going to
apply the same approach to the dilemma generated by WR.
Thus the first ingredient of the approach will be to deal with the
problem of bootstrapping by endorsing WR. With WR in place, under
no circumstances will a piece of bootstrapping allow a subject to
acquire warrant for the proposition that one of her belief sources is
reliable. For in order for an argument to have this effect, the subject’s
belief in each of its premises has to be warranted. If the argument is a
piece of bootstrapping, this warrant will have resulted from the beliefs
being formed with the belief source in question. But this requires that
the belief source be a knowledge source, and this entails, by WR, that
the proposition that the belief source is reliable has warrant for the sub-
ject. Therefore a necessary condition for a bootstrapping argument to
confer warrant on its conclusion for the subject will be satisfied only if
the conclusion already has warrant for the subject. Hence the argu-
ment will never allow the subject to obtain warrant for its conclusion.
We can illustrate the situation by looking at Roxanne’s case. If, on
the one hand, forming beliefs about the contents of her petrol tank by
looking at the gauge is a knowledge source for her, then, by WR, the
proposition that this belief source is reliable has warrant for her, and a
bootstrapping argument can’t result in her acquiring warrant for this
proposition. If, on the other hand, this belief source is not a knowledge
source, the premises of a bootstrapping argument for its reliability will
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lack warrant, and hence, once again, the argument will fail to lead to
the conclusion acquiring warrant for her.28
It should come as no surprise that my approach makes the problem
of easy knowledge disappear, since it is universally accepted that the
problem arises from the rejection of WR. What stands in the way of this
solution are the formidable difficulties that we seem to confront if we
accept WR. In the remainder of this section, I am going to focus on the
first of the three problems that I sketched in section 1. I am going to
articulate a proposal as to how to deal with the problem of the criterion
without abandoning WR.
First of all, we need a more precise formulation of the skeptical rea-
soning. The argument seeks to undermine the status of a belief source
as a knowledge source by challenging the possibility of warrant for the
corresponding reliability claim. Hence WR is a crucial premise in the
argument:
WR A belief source is a knowledge source only if the proposition
that the source is reliable has warrant for the subject.
The possibility of warrant for reliability claims is questioned by refer-
ence to the evidence that we can obtain for them. Hence the argument
needs to invoke, as in the closure-based skeptical reasoning, a principle
connecting warrant and adequate evidence, but in this case the con-
nection has to be assumed only for reliability claims:
ECR In order for a reliability claim to have warrant for a subject,
she has to have adequate evidence for it.
To impugn our evidence for a reliability claim, the argument invokes
the following principle:
NCR My evidence for the proposition that belief source S is reli-
able cannot be adequate if it relies on information that I can
obtain only from S.29
These principles do not generate a problem when the reliability of a
belief source can be supported by evidence that doesn’t violate NCR—
evidence that doesn’t involve information that I can obtain only from
the source in question. To complete the skeptical reasoning with
respect to a specific belief source, we need to invoke an additional
premise to the effect that its reliability cannot be supported by evi-
dence that satisfies NCR. Thus, for example, in the case of sense per-
ception, we would need the following principle:
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SP All the evidence that I can gather for the reliability of sense
perception relies on information that I can obtain only from
sense perception.30
With these four premises in place, the conclusion that sense percep-
tion is not a knowledge source follows unproblematically.31
As I mentioned above, nowadays the dominant strategy for avoiding
this conclusion is to abandon WR. This protects the status of a belief
source as a knowledge source from any argument purporting to estab-
lish that the subject cannot obtain warrant for the proposition that the
source is reliable. However, as we have seen, the price of this maneuver
is that one must then treat bootstrapping as a legitimate method for
obtaining warrant for this proposition.
The alternative strategy for dealing with the problem of the criterion
that I am going to recommend consists in rejecting ECR.32 It should be
clear that if we abandoned ECR, the skeptical argument could no
longer be run. Then we could concede to the skeptic that adequate evi-
dence for the reliability of one of our basic belief sources is not to be
had, but resist the further conclusion that the proposition that the
source is reliable cannot have warrant for us. In this way, we could pro-
tect the status of our basic belief sources as knowledge sources from the
skeptical reasoning without abandoning WR.33
But can ECR be abandoned? Obviously, abandoning ECR is not an
option for advocates of EC, the principle that adequate evidence is a
necessary condition for knowledge of any proposition, since ECR fol-
lows from EC as a special case. If ECR were endorsed only by advocates
of EC, I could end my discussion of the problem of the criterion here,
since I am working on the assumption that EC is false. However, this is
not the situation. ECR has found support among some of the most elo-
quent critics of EC. The principle is explicitly endorsed by William
Alston, in the course of his seminal defense of the legitimacy of boot-
strapping as a procedure for acquiring knowledge of reliability princi-
ples. It has also been advocated by James Van Cleve, another early
advocate of the legitimacy of bootstrapping.34
Both authors defend ECR on similar grounds. Alston presents his
defense in the following passage:
What alternatives are there to justification by adequate reasons? Even if
we are justified in accepting propositions that seem self-evident to us, that
would not seem to apply here. Any tendency to suppose (I) [the claim
that sense perception is reliable] to be self-evident can be put down to a
confusion between self-evidence and being strongly inclined to accept the
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proposition without question. It does not seem at all plausible to take it to
be the sort of proposition that one cannot believe without its being true,
or justified. Moreover, whereas propositions about one’s own current con-
scious states, e.g., are plausibly regarded as “self-warranted,” (I) is not
plausibly so taken. Nor does it appear to enjoy any of the other forms of
“direct” justification.35
A similar reasoning appears to be at work in Van Cleve’s recent defense
of ECR:
Principles affirming the reliability of our faculties are both contingent and
general. For me, it is hard to see how a principle combining these features
can be basic—at least if basic propositions comprise only those that are
somehow immediately evident or obvious.36
Both authors explicitly accept the possibility of warrant in the absence
of adequate reasons, thus distancing themselves from EC. Neverthe-
less, they refrain from taking the further step of rejecting ECR, on the
grounds that the other ways in which a proposition might acquire war-
rant for a subject are not suitable in the specific case of reliability prin-
ciples. They both consider similar alternatives—“self-evidence” and
“self-warrant” in Alston’s version of the argument, and “immediate evi-
dence” or “obviousness” in Van Cleve’s. They appear to have in mind
the form of noninferential warrant contemplated by traditional foun-
dationalism, to which I shall loosely refer as givenist warrant.37
I think we can agree with Alston and Van Cleve that even if one
accepts the possibility of givenist warrant in general, it would be utterly
implausible to suggest that reliability principles can obtain warrant for
a subject in this way. But, like every argument by elimination, this one
will work only if the options that are ruled out exhaust the range of pos-
sibilities. And at this point the Alston-Van Cleve argument for ECR is
open to attack. Their reasoning could be resisted by any philosopher
who accepts forms of warrant other than inferential and givenist war-
rant. This camp includes a large number of contemporary epistemol-
ogists, for whom a subject can come to have warrant for a proposition
as a result of the instantiation of a natural property that constitutes a
sufficient condition for warrant that can’t be reduced to the inferential
or givenist model.38 Let me refer to this kind of warrant as naturalistic
warrant, and to those who are prepared to countenance the possibility
of naturalistic warrant as naturalists. I shall not try to argue here that
there are alternatives to inferential and givenist warrant, or that natu-
ralistic warrant should be counted among them. Instead, I shall adopt
the same attitude as with regard to EC, introducing as an assumption of
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my subsequent discussion the claim that naturalistic warrant is a genu-
ine possibility. Hence for the remainder, my audience will be restricted
to naturalistic epistemologists. My goal will be to convince them of the
virtues of my approach. For the naturalist, ECR is not supported by the
Alston-Van Cleve elimination argument, since it does not contemplate
the possibility that reliability principles obtain warrant for a subject
according to the naturalistic model.39 Hence, unless an argument is
provided to show that naturalistic warrant is not suitable for reliability
principles, it is open to the naturalist to reject ECR, and hence to
embrace WR without falling prey to the problem of the criterion.
6. Intuitions
Let me consider now the second family of obstacles to the adoption of
WR. It has been argued that principles along the lines of WR should be
rejected on the grounds that they are in conflict with our intuitions
concerning warrant. There are cases, the thought goes, in which we
would want to say that a belief source is a knowledge source even
though the subject does not know that the source is reliable. Propo-
nents of this line of thought have sought to elicit this intuition with two
main kinds of case. In this section, I am going to argue that neither type
of case can be used to undermine the position that I am advocating.
The first type of case that I want to consider involves cognizers that
seem perfectly capable of acquiring knowledge with their belief
sources but lack the conceptual sophistication that would be required
for forming reliability beliefs. Nonhuman animals and human infants
can be claimed to fall in this category, but even among adult humans
the requisite conceptual sophistication is surely much less widespread
than is sometimes assumed. Forming a reliability belief requires pos-
sessing concepts such as belief source and reliability, which cannot be
expected to figure in most people’s conceptual repertoires, but it
would seem wrong to make knowledge the exclusive preserve of the
intellectual elite who have these concepts at their disposal.40
It seems to me that these intuitions are perfectly sound. I want to say
that by using his sensory devices, my one-year-old son can come to
know that there is someone at the door, and I have no problem accord-
ing the same treatment to my dog.41 But my son, let alone my dog,
can’t form the belief that his sensory devices are reliable, for lack of the
requisite concepts. It should be clear, however, that these intuitions
don’t put the slightest pressure on WR. They certainly undermine the
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stronger principle that in order for a belief source to be a source of
knowledge, the subject needs to know that the source is reliable. The
reason is that, since knowing that p requires believing that p, the fact
that neither my son nor my dog can believe that his sensory devices are
reliable entails that they can’t know it either. And then this principle
would force us to accept that their sensory devices can’t be knowledge
sources. But none of this applies to WR. Having warrant for the prop-
osition that p, unlike knowing that p, does not require believing that p.
Hence the observation that my son and my dog can’t form the belief
that their sensory devices are reliable is perfectly compatible with the
hypothesis that this proposition has warrant for them.42 Our intuitions
regarding these cases put no pressure on WR.
The second kind of case that I want to consider involves subjects that
seem intuitively capable of acquiring knowledge with a belief source,
even though they have no evidence for its reliability. This type of situ-
ation is clearly exemplified by the case that Vogel borrows from
Michael Williams to introduce his discussion of bootstrapping:
Williams describes himself driving a car with a working, highly reliable gas
gauge. Williams does not know, however, that the gauge is reliable. Let us
stipulate that he has never checked it, he has never been told anything
about its reliability, and he does not even have any background informa-
tion as to whether gauges like his are likely to be working. He never takes
any special steps to see whether the gauge is going up or down when it
ought to be. Rather, without giving the matter a second thought, Williams
simply goes by what the gauge says.43
Notice how Vogel supports the claim that Williams doesn’t know that
the gauge is reliable. He is drawing this conclusion from the stipulation
that Williams has no evidence for the reliability of the gauge. This sug-
gests that accepting the intuition that “going by what the gauge says”
can be a knowledge source for Williams would not force us to abandon
WR. All we would have to accept is that a belief source can be a knowl-
edge source when the subject lacks adequate evidence for its reliability.
But this admission would put pressure on WR only in the presence of
ECR, and so far we haven’t found any reason why the naturalist should
subscribe to this principle.
Hence, of the two main types of case that have been invoked to
exhibit a conflict between principles along the lines of WR and our
intuitions, we have found that one poses no threat to WR, while to show
that the other exhibits a conflict requires invoking a principle, ECR,
which the naturalist can be expected to reject. Therefore, for the nat-
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uralist, neither type of case reveals a conflict between WR and our intu-
itions.
7. WR and Reliabilism
I turn now to the third family of considerations against the adoption of
WR that I want to discuss. So far I have argued that the naturalist should
not be discouraged from adopting the principle either by the problem
of the criterion or by our intuitions concerning when a belief source
can be a knowledge source. It may seem, however, that for those natu-
ralists who subscribe to a reliabilist account of warrant, embracing WR
is still not an option, since WR appears to be incompatible with reliabi-
lism. My goal in this section is to raise some questions for this line of
thought.
Reliabilism, in its strongest form, postulates necessary and sufficient
conditions for a belief to have warrant. It will be useful for our purposes
to subdivide the issue of the compatibility of reliabilism with WR into
two separate questions—namely, whether WR is incompatible with the
sufficient conditions for warrant postulated by reliabilism and whether
it is incompatible with the necessary conditions for warrant postulated
by reliabilism.
Let me look first at the question concerning reliabilist sufficient con-
ditions. We can frame the issue in terms of a simple logical point. The
claim that S is a sufficient condition for a state of affairs X imposes very
precise limits on what can count as a necessary condition for X—N can
be a necessary condition for X only if S is sufficient for N.
Now, since WR expresses a necessary condition for a belief source to
be a knowledge source, we can derive from this logical point a criterion
for when a sufficient condition for a belief source to be a knowledge
source is compatible with WR:
WR* S can be a sufficient condition for a belief source to be a
knowledge source only if S is a sufficient condition for the
subject’s having warrant for the proposition that the source
is reliable.
The claim I am making is that a sufficient condition for a belief source
to be a knowledge source is compatible with WR just in case it satisfies
the criterion expressed by WR*. This is hardly surprising, since WR* is
in fact equivalent to WR.
We can now use WR* to assess the compatibility between reliabilism
and WR. Clearly, a reliabilist sufficient condition for warrant can be
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expected to entail a sufficient condition for a belief source to be a
knowledge source. A reliabilist sufficient condition for warrant can be
expressed in terms of the following schema:
RS If a belief has been formed with a belief source that is reliable
and satisfies conditions C, then the belief has warrant.
It follows from a claim of this form that the reliability of a belief source
and its satisfying the C-conditions are jointly sufficient for the belief
source to be a knowledge source. Hence, in light of WR*, it follows that
a reliabilist sufficient condition for warrant will be compatible with WR
just in case, for any belief source that satisfies the C-conditions, its reli-
ability is sufficient for the proposition that the source is reliable to have
warrant for the subject.
Clearly, any hopes that a reliabilist account of warrant will be com-
patible with WR will rest on what it treats as the C-conditions in the
schema RS. To see this, notice that the unrestricted claim that a subject
has warrant for the proposition that a belief source is reliable whenever
the source is in fact reliable would be utterly counterintuitive.44 I want
to suggest, however, that when we look at the specific conditions under
which reliabilists take reliable formation to be sufficient for warrant,
the case for incompatibility starts to appear rather weak. I shall concen-
trate on the version of reliabilism put forward by Alvin Goldman.45
Central to Goldman’s reliabilist account of knowledge and justifica-
tion is a contrast between two types of belief sources: “basic psycholog-
ical processes, on the one hand, and various sorts of algorithms,
heuristics or learnable methodologies, on the other.”46 He refers to
the former as processes and the latter as methods. Let’s consider the
situation concerning each of these types of belief source.
For beliefs that have been formed with a method, Goldman explic-
itly declares the reliability of the method insufficient for warrant. In
order for such a belief to have warrant, in addition, the method needs
to have been acquired (or sustained) by a reliable second-order pro-
cess, that is, one that has a high ratio of reliable methods among the
methods it generates.47 Hence in the instance of RS that expresses
Goldman’s version of reliabilism, the C-conditions will include a clause
to the effect that if the source is a method, it will have been acquired or
sustained by a reliable second-order process.48
I want to suggest that this feature of the account significantly weak-
ens the intuitive plausibility of the claim that reliabilism is incompati-
ble with WR. The most obvious cases where we wouldn’t want to say that
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the reliability of a source confers warrant for the subject on the prop-
osition that the source is reliable are cases in which the source has been
more or less randomly adopted by the subject. The example that Gold-
man uses in this connection will illustrate the point:
[S]uppose our friend Humperdink has attended a series of talks on math-
ematics by a certain Elmer Fraud. These talks are not under the auspices
of any certified educational institution, and Humperdink has been
warned that Fraud has no credentials in mathematics. Humperdink hears
Fraud enunciate numerous principles and algorithms, almost all of them
defective. Nonetheless, being a complete novice—and a gullible one at
that—Humperdink blindly accepts and applies them all. In one case,
however, Fraud happens to teach a perfectly correct algorithm. Humper-
dink internalizes this one along with the others, and applies it to a rele-
vant class of problems.49
In this kind of case, intuition is firmly set against the idea that the sub-
ject has warrant for the proposition that the belief source is reliable,
even if the source is, as a matter of fact, reliable. Hence it would be hard
to defend the compatibility of WR with a version of reliabilism that
treated a belief source in these circumstances as a knowledge source.
But Goldman’s version of reliabilism doesn’t face this problem. The
second-order process requirement is introduced, precisely, to rule out
these belief sources as knowledge sources. On Goldman’s account,
Humperdink’s internalized correct algorithm is not a knowledge
source, even though it is reliable, because it was acquired with an unre-
liable second-order process. Therefore, the intuition that the proposi-
tion that the algorithm is reliable has no warrant for Humperdink
lends no support to the claim that Goldman’s reliabilism is incompat-
ible with WR. I shall not try to consider in detail how the point gener-
alizes. I want only to suggest that when a belief source has been
acquired with a reliable second-order process, the reliabilist should
have no problem accepting the claim that the proposition that the
source is reliable has warrant for the subject. And if this is so, the suffi-
cient conditions postulated by Goldman’s reliabilism for a method to
count as a knowledge source are perfectly compatible with WR.
In the case of processes, the situation is very different. The addi-
tional conditions that a process has to satisfy in order to count as a
knowledge source, on Goldman’s account, are purely negative. So long
as the subject’s cognitive state at the time does not undermine the war-
rant she would otherwise have for the beliefs that she forms with a reli-
able process, the process will count as a knowledge source. This means
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that a proponent of Goldman’s reliabilism who wants to subscribe to
WR would have to accept that in many cases the reliability of a process
is a sufficient condition for the proposition that the process is reliable
to have warrant for the subject.
I want to suggest that the reliabilist should have no qualms about
accepting this point. Notice that the reliabilist is prepared to sanction
the subject’s use of a reliable process by ascribing warrant to the beliefs
that she forms with it. For the reliabilist, using the process is the right
thing for the subject to do, from an epistemic point of view. Now, in
some cases the trust that the subject places in the process by using it will
crystallize into a belief in its reliability. It seems to me that the consid-
erations that support the epistemic sanction that the reliabilist is pre-
pared to extend to the subject’s use of her process would in principle
also support, in these cases, ascribing warrant to her belief in its reli-
ability. And if this suggestion is correct, the reliabilist sufficient condi-
tions for a process to be a source of knowledge will also be compatible
with WR.
Let me now move on to considering the compatibility of WR with the
necessary conditions for warrant postulated by reliabilism. Here we
seem to face a more serious problem. According to reliabilism, reliable
formation is a necessary condition for a belief to have warrant. This
would apply, in particular, to a belief in the reliability of a belief
source—if it hasn’t been formed with a reliable source, then it doesn’t
have warrant. But WR appears to license counterexamples to this prin-
ciple. Suppose that S is a reliable belief source that is a knowledge
source. Then, according to WR, the proposition that S is reliable will
have warrant for the subject, whether or not she believes this proposi-
tion. And if she does believe it, her belief will have the status of knowl-
edge, whether or not it has been formed with a reliable source. If her
belief in the reliability of S has not been formed with a reliable source,
we will have a violation of the necessary condition for warrant imposed
by reliabilism.
I think that we have now identified a genuine source of conflict
between WR and reliabilism—but one that the reliabilist could easily
avert. All that would be required is a slight weakening of the sufficient
conditions for warrant postulated by the account—namely a provision
to the effect that a belief source will not count as a knowledge source
if the subject believes it to be reliable and this belief has not been
formed with a reliable source.50 Notice, first, that if this provision is
introduced the conflict disappears, as the resulting account would no
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longer force the proponent of WR to ascribe warrant to reliability
beliefs that the account is committed to treating as unwarranted. Fur-
thermore, the introduction of the provision can be defended from
principles with indisputable reliabilist credentials. If we are prepared,
with Goldman, to withhold the status of knowledge source from a
belief source that has been acquired with an unreliable second-order
process, we should have no problem with according the same treat-
ment to a belief source when the subject’s belief in its reliability has
been formed with an unreliable source.
Let me now consider briefly another objection often leveled against
the principle that a belief source has to be known to be reliable in
order to count as a knowledge source. The thought is that the principle
generates an infinite regress.51 The argument goes roughly as follows:
if belief source S1 has to be known to be reliable in order to be a knowl-
edge source, then the subject needs to have formed the belief that S1
is reliable with a belief source S2 that is a knowledge source. But this
would require, in turn, that S2 is known to be reliable, and hence that
the subject has formed the belief that S2 is reliable with a belief source
S3 that is a knowledge source… I shall not try to provide a precise for-
mulation of the argument, or consider how one might try to save from
this attack the principle that a knowledge source has to be known to be
reliable. I want to point out only that the objection doesn’t apply to
WR. Notice that WR doesn’t require “an infinite hierarchy of reliability
beliefs.”52 In fact, WR doesn’t require any reliability beliefs at all in
order for a belief source to be a knowledge source. Warrant for a reli-
ability proposition is required, but a regress of warranted reliability
propositions is not generated either. For the warrant of the reliability
proposition does not arise from the operation of a knowledge source,
but from the satisfaction of the condition that bestows on the belief
source the status of knowledge source. Hence WR does not generate
the need for further warranted propositions.53
8. WR, Externalism and Naturalism
I would like to end with two brief remarks about how the claims that I
have defended affect the standard conception of the range of episte-
mological options. My first point concerns the contrast between inter-
nalist and externalist views in epistemology. I am going to focus on Van
Cleve’s construal of the contrast, although many others would construe
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it along the same lines. Van Cleve characterizes internalism in the fol-
lowing terms:
The core tenet of the internalist views is this: there is no first-order knowl-
edge unless there is also higher-order knowledge with respect to the fac-
tors that make first-order knowledge possible.54
Externalist views are characterized accordingly by the rejection of this
tenet. I argued in the preceding section that a minor modification of a
standard version of reliabilism would render it compatible with WR.
Hence it would be open to the reliabilist to adopt WR, thereby avoiding
the problem of easy knowledge. The point I want to make is that this
position would count as internalist in Van Cleve’s taxonomy, since
according to it, reliable belief formation makes knowledge possible
only if there is higher-order knowledge (or at least higher-order war-
rant) with respect to this factor.55 I am not going to discuss whether
this is a satisfactory outcome. I simply want to point out that if this were
correct, it would force us to abandon the standard conception of reli-
abilist accounts of warrant as fundamentally opposed to internalism. A
reliabilist could embrace internalism without abandoning the central
ingredients of her account of warrant.
The second point I want to make concerns the relationship between
WR and naturalism. I think there is a widespread implicit assumption
to the effect that acceptance of naturalistic warrant should be corre-
lated with hostility towards higher-order requirements, such as WR—
that naturalists should reject these requirements. In light of our discus-
sion of WR, it appears that in this particular case, the assumption gets
things precisely the wrong way round. I have argued that the standard
obstacles to the adoption of WR can be regarded as genuine only by
those who reject the possibility of naturalistic warrant. Hence, far from
being a consequence of naturalism, the rejection of WR can be sup-
ported only from an antinaturalist point of view.
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such knowledge any harder. This point highlights the fact that there are two
separate worries that we could have with respect to an account of warrant: one
is that it renders bootstrapping legitimate, and the other is that it makes
knowledge of the reliability of a belief source too easy. I am using the label the
problem of easy knowledge for the first of these worries, and this problem would
be solved by the adoption of WR. Clearly, though, adopting WR wouldn’t by
itself solve the second problem. The effect of the adoption of WR is that when-
ever your position treats a belief source as a knowledge source but fails to
ascribe warrant to the subject for the proposition that the source is reliable,
you have a conflict that needs to be resolved—either by stripping the belief
source of the status of being a knowledge source or by ascribing warrant to the
subject for the reliability claim. Whether knowledge of the reliability of a belief
source will become harder as a result of adopting WR will depend on which of
these two strategies is adopted in each case. Notice also that we might still
need to impose constraints to rule out bootstrapping as a legitimate strategy
that a subject could employ to bestow on a reliability claim an epistemic status
other than warrant.
29 Notice that NCR is entailed by NC.
30 For a book-length defense of this claim, see William P. Alston, The Reliabil-
ity of Sense Perception (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
31 As with EC, different versions of ECR will result depending on the degree
of evidential support that we require for evidence to count as adequate. But
the skeptical argument against the possibility of obtaining warrant for a reli-
ability claim doesn’t trade on setting the evidence threshold for warrant par-
ticularly high. If NCR imposes a legitimate constraint on adequate evidence
for some level of evidential support, it will remain legitimate when the thresh-
old is set very low.
32 As with EC (see note 20), the proposal is to reject every version of the
principle—even those that set very weak levels of evidential support as a neces-
sary condition for knowledge.
33 Notice that if we abandon WR, a transmission principle might force us to
abandon NCR, but if we keep WR, NCR does not come under this kind of pres-
sure. Hence if NCR is independently plausible (and, for what it’s worth, I
believe it is), this will be a further advantage of the approach to the problem of
the criterion that I am recommending.
34 Cohen has also endorsed the principle. See Cohen, “Basic Knowledge
and the Problem of Easy Knowledge,” 309.
35 Alston, “Epistemic Circularity,” 4–5.
36 Van Cleve, “Is Knowledge Easy—or Impossible?” 51. This argument for
ECR is Van Cleve’s principal objection to a solution to the problem of the cri-
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terion along the lines of the one that I am advocating, which he ascribes to
Thomas Reid.
37 I am borrowing the term from James Van Cleve, “Epistemic Superve-
nience and the Circle of Belief,” The Monist 68 (1985): 90–104.
38 One of the most influential examples of this position is the reliabilist view
that, in some circumstances, if you have formed the belief that p with a reliable
process, then you have warrant for p. See Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and
Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), for a defense of this
view.
39 Alston’s and Van Cleve’s advocacy of this line of reasoning is extremely
puzzling, since both have championed the view that givenist warrant is not the
only alternative to inferential warrant. See, for example, Van Cleve, “Epistemic
Supervenience and the Circle of Belief,” 95–96; Alston, “Epistemic Circular-
ity,” 12–14.
40 For an attack on this kind of elitism, see Alston, “What's Wrong with
Immediate Knowledge?”
41 See Fred Dretske, “Two Conceptions of Knowledge: Rational vs. Reliable
Belief,” Grazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1991): 15–30, for a compelling defense
of these intuitions.
42 Notice that even if my son (or my dog) doesn’t believe that his perceptual
devices are reliable, one could argue that his behavior manifests what we
might call subdoxastic acceptance of this proposition: in using his perceptual
devices to find out how things stand, he conducts himself as if he believed that
they are reliable. To defend WR from the line of attack under consideration, it
would suffice to argue that the range of propositions for which a subject can,
in principle, have warrant includes those to which she displays this kind of sub-
doxastic acceptance, even if we concede that many other propositions are
excluded from this range by the limitations of the subject’s conceptual reper-
toire (it is hard to see, for example, under what circumstances my son could
count, any time soon, as having warrant for the proposition that every even
number is the sum of two primes).
43 Vogel, “Reliabilism Leveled,” 612. Williams presents the example in
Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scep-
ticism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 347ff.
44 For a counterexample to the unrestricted claim, see the Humperdink
case that Goldman describes in the passage quoted below.
45 As presented in Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition. See also Alvin I.
Goldman, “Strong and Weak Justification,” in Epistemology, Philosophical Per-
spectives 2, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1988), 51–69.
46 Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, 93.
47 See ibid., 51–53, 93–95.
48 In Epistemology and Cognition there is no explicit discussion of the possibil-
ity of higher-order methods, beyond a passing allusion to going beyond sec-
ond-order processes (see p. 53). However, there is no obvious reason why
Goldman shouldn’t make room for this possibility. This would require a
slightly more sophisticated account of how a first-order method would have to
be acquired in order to qualify as a knowledge source.
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49 Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, 52–53.
50 Notice that this provision would not treat reliably formed belief in a
belief source’s reliability as a necessary condition for this belief source to
count as a knowledge source. If the subject didn’t believe the source to be reli-
able, the provision wouldn’t prevent the source from counting as a knowledge
source. The provision is activated only when the subject believes the source to
be reliable and this belief has not been reliably formed.
51 See Alvin I. Goldman, “Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism,” in
Philosophical Naturalism, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19, ed. Peter French,
Theodor Uehling Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1994), 301–20, at 311ff.; Vogel, “Reliabilism Leveled,” 606–7.
52 Goldman, “Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism,” 311.
53 The version of the difficulty based on supervenience that Goldman con-
siders doesn’t apply either. As Goldman himself notes, “Perhaps superve-
nience could still be satisfied, for example, if (first-order) instantiation of the
CRP property [the reliabilist sufficient condition for justification] itself neces-
sitated satisfaction of clause (B) [the demand for justified belief in the reliabil-
ity of the process]” (ibid., 312). Goldman’s objection to this point is that “no
such necessitation obtains” (ibid.). I think he is right in this, but notice that his
argument for this claim rests crucially on the fact that (B) involves the subject
having higher-order beliefs. Hence, the objection doesn’t carry over to my pro-
posal, and supervenience will be satisfied by virtue of the fact that the higher-
order requirement imposed by WR (warrant for the proposition that the
source is reliable) is necessitated by the naturalistic sufficient condition for the
belief source to be a knowledge source.
54 Van Cleve, “Is Knowledge Easy—or Impossible?” 45.
55 In the formulation that I quote, internalism calls for higher-order knowl-
edge, but Van Cleve makes it clear later on that a view that demanded higher-
order warrant would also count as internalist. See ibid., 45–46.
